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DENIED IN FULL

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1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GENERAL CESAR B E N A V I D E S,  
WHO WAS CHANGED FROM MINISTER OF INTERIOR TO MINISTER OF DEFENSE,  
WAS UPSET BECAUSE [REDACTED] HIS REMOVAL AS MINISTER OF  
INTERIOR COULD BE INTERPRETED AS CRITICISM FOR THE WAY HE  
HANDLED THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ISSUANCE OF FALSE PASSPORTS  
IN THE ORLANDO L E T E L I E R CASE. [REDACTED]

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COMMENT:

3. SOME ARMY LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES ALSO CRITICIZED THE AMNESTY ANNOUNCED BY THE GOVERNMENT. THEY EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE AMNESTY REFLECTED GOVERNMENT WEAKNESS IN THE FACE OF THE PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAVED IN TO PRESSURE FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WITH A RESULTANT LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE AMNESTY WOULD TRIGGER A LOT OF PROBLEMS BECAUSE MARXIST ELEMENTS AND OTHER RADICALS WOULD BECOME POLITICIALLY ACTIVE ONCE AGAIN.

4.

[REDACTED] BRIEFED [REDACTED] ON THE AMNESTY. THEY TOLD THE GROUP THAT THERE WERE THREE BASIC REASONS FOR TAKING THIS MEASURE:

- A. TO IMPROVE CHILE'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE.
- B. TO REDUCE INTERNAL POLITICAL UNREST AND DEVELOP A MORE PEACEFUL INTERNAL CLIMATE.

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[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
C. TO AVOID ANY TRIALS AFFECTING MILITARY PERSONNEL OR  
MEMBERS OF CHILEAN SECURITY SERVICES WHO COULD BE ACCUSED OF  
BEING INVOLVED IN POLITICAL INCIDENTS DURING THE PAST SEVERAL  
YEARS.

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[REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS LAST POINT WAS CLEARLY DESIGNED TO PROTECT  
PEOPLE INVOLVED IN ANY ILLEGAL DINA OPERATIONS, OTHER THAN  
POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION, WHICH WAS  
SPECIFICALLY EXCLUDED FROM THE TERMS OF THE AMNESTY. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

6. A LARGE NUMBER OF INFLUENTIAL CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS OF  
THE GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING FORMER CONSERVATIVE POLITICIANS AND  
LEADING PROFESSIONALS AND BUSINESSMEN, ARE CRITICAL OF RECENT  
ACTIONS TAKEN BY PRESIDENT PINOCHET AS BEING TOO OPENLY DESIGNED  
TO CURRY FAVOR WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THERE HAS ALSO BEEN WIDESPREAD  
CRITICISM OF THE PRESIDENT FOR THE HASTY MANNER IN WHICH A KEY  
SUSPECT IN THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION, WHO HAD ADMITTEDLY WORKED  
FOR THE DINA, WAS TURNED OVER TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

7. IN ADDITION, A MAJORITY OF THESE INFLUENTIAL CIVILIANS  
ARE BEGINNING TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT, THROUGH  
THE DINA, WAS IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF LETELIER,  
BASED ON THE FACTS WHICH HAVE EMERGED IN RECENT WEEKS. THE  
OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS, ALTHOUGH SUPPORTERS  
OF THE GOVERNMENT, DO NOT AGREE THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTION SHOULD  
HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT. MANY OF THESE  
INDIVIDUALS ALSO BELIEVE THAT PINOCHET'S RECENT ACTIONS, OPENLY  
DESIGNED TO PLEASE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, DEMONSTRATE HIS GROWING  
WEAKNESS, AND INDICATE THAT PINOCHET IS AWARE THAT FIRM EVIDENCE  
OF DINA COMPLICITY IN THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION WILL SURFACE AS  
THE INVESTIGATION PROCEEDS.

8. THE MAJORITY OF CIVILIAN LEADERS BELIEVE THAT PRESIDENT  
PINOCHET WILL BE FORCED OUT OF OFFICE IF FIRM EVIDENCE SURFACES  
THAT DINA WAS BEHIND THE LETELIER ASSASSINATION. THEY BELIEVE  
THAT PINOCHET HAS BEEN TOO CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH FORMER DINA  
HEAD GENERAL (R) MANUEL CONTRERAS TO SURVIVE SUCH A  
REVELATION. THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN SOME SPECULATION ABOUT

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9. ~~REDACTED~~ COMMENT: ~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~ A MAJORITY OF SENIOR ARMY LEADERS CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF LETELIER. HOWEVER, IF DINA'S INVOLVEMENT BECOMES CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE, PINOCHET WOULD LOSE THE SUPPORT OF A MAJORITY OF ARMY LEADERS AND WOULD BE FORCED FROM OFFICE. THE MAJORITY OF ARMY LEADERS WOULD NOT AGREE THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THIS TYPE OF VIOLENT ACTION. IN THE EVENT PINOCHET WERE TO BE FORCED FROM OFFICE THERE ARE FOUR ARMY LEADERS WHO WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY TO REPLACE HIM: GENERAL CARLOS F O R E S T I E R, VICE-COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; GENERAL WASHINGTON C A R R A S C O, CHIEF OF ARMY GENERAL STAFF;

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[REDACTED]  
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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
GENERAL BENAVIDES AND GENERAL TORO. GENERAL TORO PROBABLY WOULD BE THE MOST ACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE AMONG THIS GROUP TO OTHER MILITARY SERVICES AND TO CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.)

10. (EMBASSY COMMENT: FOR EMBASSY ANALYSIS OF THIS GENERAL SUBJECT SEE SANTIAGO EMB TEL 2976 OF APRIL 20, 1978. SPECIFICALLY, REGARDING THIS REPORT, WE WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT BRADY, WHILE PERSONALLY PIQUED AT PINOCHET, IS NOT A HARDLINER. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO UNDERLINE THAT THE RECENT AMNESTY SEEMS TO BE DESIGNED TO ALSO PREVENT FUTURE TALK OF ANY MILITARY ACCUSED OF MURDER OR TORTURE BETWEEN SEPTEMBER 11, 1973 AND APRIL 1978.)

11. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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12. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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